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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Robert T. Miller filed suit against American Airlines, 
Inc., the American Airlines, Inc. Pilot Retirement Benefit 
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Program Fixed Income Plan, and the American Airlines, Inc. 
Pension Benefits Administration Committee (collectively, 
“American”), alleging a violation of § 502(a)(1)(B) of the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).  Miller asserted that American 
impermissibly terminated his long-term disability benefits, 
and informed him of this action in a vague and misleading 
letter.  He further alleged that American‟s review of his case 
failed to consider all of his relevant diagnoses, as well as the 
unique requirements of his employment as a pilot.  The 
District Court granted American‟s Motion for Summary 
Judgment, ruling that American‟s termination decision was 
proper.  This appeal requires us to consider whether the 
administrative process that American employed complied 
with the procedural mandates of ERISA and, if not, whether 
the proper remedy is a remand to the plan administrator or a 
reinstatement of benefits.  For the reasons stated herein, we 
will reverse the decision of the District Court.  We hold that 
the termination of Miller‟s benefits was arbitrary and 
capricious in light of the numerous substantive deficiencies 
and procedural irregularities that pervaded American‟s 
decision-making process.  We further hold that Miller is 
entitled to retroactive reinstatement of his disability benefits. 
I. 
A.  Factual History 
 Miller was employed as a commercial airline pilot for 
American Airlines for nearly ten years.  In August 1998, 
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Miller suffered a psychotic episode while on duty and was 
subsequently admitted to the hospital.  He was prescribed 
various medications as part of his treatment regimen.  
Miller‟s FAA medical certification, required for all 
commercial pilots, was revoked. 
 Miller applied for long-term disability (“LTD”) 
benefits under the American Airlines, Inc. Pilot Retirement 
Benefit Program Fixed Income Plan (the “Plan”), a defined 
benefit plan subject to ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.  
Miller began receiving treatment from a psychiatrist, Dr. Abel 
Gonzalez, in September 1998.  Dr. Gonzalez diagnosed 
Miller as suffering from anxiety disorder and brief reactive 
psychosis.  On February 3, 1999, Dr. Gonzalez reported to 
American that Miller had suffered brief reactive psychosis 
caused by physical fatigue, sleep deprivation, and emotional 
stress, and that his progress was “favorable.”  Thereafter, 
American awarded Miller LTD benefits in November 1999. 
 The Plan provides “own occupation” disability 
benefits, where a pilot deemed disabled from employment as 
a pilot for American may receive benefits even if he could 
work in a different capacity.  Under the Plan, “[d]isability 
means an illness or injury verified through a qualified medical 
authority . . . which prevents a Member from continuing to 
act as an Active Pilot Employee in the Service of the 
Employer.”  (App. at 717.)  In addition, an employee will no 
longer be eligible for LTD benefits if, among other things, 
“verification of such Disability can no longer be established.”  
(Id. at 739.)  The Plan vests discretionary authority with a 
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Pension Benefits Administration Committee (“PBAC”) that 
has the power to determine benefits eligibility.  Charlotte 
Teklitz was the delegate of the PBAC who reviewed appeals 
from the denial or termination of benefits. 
 In May 2003, American informed Miller that it could 
no longer substantiate his disability and terminated his 
benefits as a result.  Dr. Gonzalez subsequently submitted 
documentation reiterating that Miller had been diagnosed 
with anxiety and brief reactive psychosis.  Dr. Gonzalez noted 
that Miller had taken medication until January 2000 and that 
he had been “asymptomatic” since the spring of 2001.  (Id. at 
112.)  He further noted that Miller would be able to return to 
work once his FAA medicate certification was reinstated.  In 
June 2003, Dr. Gonzalez provided four progress notes at 
American‟s request.  His notes stated that Miller remained 
asymptomatic, that he was not taking any medication, and 
that pursuant to FAA regulations he was still not able to 
work.  After receiving this information, American determined 
that Miller “[m]edically qualifies for [the] disability pension 
program” and reinstated his LTD benefits.  (Id. at 148.) 
 Over the next two years, American periodically 
requested medical updates from Miller to document his 
disability.  In response, Dr. Gonzalez provided documentation 
that Miller was still under his care, that he was seen monthly, 
and that he was not taking any medication.  American 
subsequently noted that Miller was not expected to return to 
work.  In August 2005, Miller provided another letter from 
Dr. Gonzalez reporting that Miller was asymptomatic, that he 
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required adequate sleep to prevent manifestations of stress, 
and that he was not taking any medication.  On October 16, 
2006, Dr. Gonzalez provided four additional progress notes 
stating that Miller‟s diagnosis was the same, that he was 
doing well, that he was “in general asymptomatic with good 
mental stability,” and that he was not taking any medication.  
(Id. at 107.) 
 On October 23, 2006, American sent Miller a letter 
notifying him that his LTD benefits were terminated.  The 
letter provided: 
We are in receipt of your recent correspondence 
from Dr. Abel Gonzalez, submitted in response 
to our letter of September 21, 2006 from Jeanne 
Spoon, RN.  However, we are unable to verify 
either the existence of a continuing medical 
disability or your continued substantial progress 
towards obtaining your FAA medical 
certification. 
(Id. at 98.)  The letter then quoted the Plan and stated that a 
pilot‟s disability will cease if “verification of such Disability 
can no longer be established.”  (Id.)  The letter further 
elaborated: 
In order to receive further favorable 
consideration, you will need to demonstrate that 
you are actively pursuing obtaining your FAA 
medical certification. 
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At this time, however, verification of your 
continued disability cannot be established and 
your disability benefits under the Plan will end 
immediately[.] 
(Id.)  Significantly, the Plan does not make eligibility for 
LTD benefits contingent on a pilot‟s pursuing medical 
certification with the FAA.  Upon receiving this letter, Miller 
contacted American and inquired as to why his benefits were 
terminated.  In response, American referred him to the 
termination letter and did not provide any additional 
information.  Miller appealed the decision to the PBAC on 
November 30, 2006.  To support his claim, Miller included a 
completed appeal form stating that he continued to have 
active psychiatric diagnoses and submitted a letter from Dr. 
Gonzalez. 
 In this letter, Dr. Gonzalez stated that Miller “has been 
continually and [] permanently disabled from obtaining a 
Class One Medical Certificate as required by F.A.A. 
regulations since August of 1998.”  (Id. at 340.)  Dr. 
Gonzalez further clarified that Miller “remains permanently 
disabled due to medical reasons.”  (Id.)  According to Dr. 
Gonzalez, Miller continued to suffer from anxiety and 
psychosis, as he had since his original diagnosis.  Dr. 
Gonzalez then went on to summarize Miller‟s treatment: 
The necessity for this continuated [sic] 
treatment has and will continue to exist because 
of the nature of his psychiatric conditions.  
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More specifically, his diagnosis reveals and 
refers to latent vulnerability on his mental status 
so that prevention [sic] medical treatment, when 
adequate, may be sufficient.  However, no 
medical treatment has the capacity to neither 
revert, undo, nor cure such condition. 
(Id.)  Dr. Gonzalez concluded by noting that Miller continued 
on active treatment necessary to preserve his health and that 
his prognosis was fair. 
 In light of the disagreement as to Miller‟s eligibility 
for LTD benefits, American referred the case to Western 
Medical Evaluators (“WME”) for an outside medical review 
on March 27, 2007.
1
  American directed WME to perform an 
“evidence-based, forensic medical review/evaluation” of 
Miller‟s case.  (Id. at 300.)  The letter from American stated 
that Miller‟s “[c]onditions [c]laimed” were anxiety disorder 
and brief reactive psychosis.  (Id.)  Additionally, American 
prompted WME to answer six specific questions regarding 
the evidentiary support for the “continuing presence of 
[Miller‟s] psychiatric diagnoses.”  (Id. at 301.) 
                                                 
1
 The Plan dictates that disputes will be referred to a 
clinical authority and that those findings “regarding the nature 
and extent of such illness or injury shall be final and binding 
upon the Administrator, the Association and the Member and 
his Beneficiaries.”  (App. at 785-86.) 
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In response, Drs. Seskind and Crain of WME reviewed 
Miller‟s file and provided American with a report on 
April 20, 2007.  Neither performed a physical evaluation of 
Miller or communicated with him.  Dr. Crain‟s report 
reviewed the documents in Miller‟s file and found that the 
records “did not document any psychiatric problems or 
explain [Miller‟s] failure to obtain the required medical 
certificate.”  (Id. at 310.)  As such, Dr. Crain determined that 
Miller was not disabled.  Dr. Seskind‟s portion of the report 
noted that FAA standards require that a pilot not suffer from 
psychosis.  He then went on to say it was “crucial to note” 
that Miller was not undergoing psychotherapy, that he was 
not taking medication, and that he had not attempted to obtain 
his FAA medical certification.  (Id. at 312.)  In light of the 
fact that Miller had not requested a formal approval of his 
psychiatric designation from an FAA medical examiner and 
been denied this certification, Dr. Seskind found that Miller 
“is therefore not really disabled.”  (Id.)  On May 22, 2007, 
American sent Miller a letter which included the WME report 
and reaffirmed the termination decision. 
B.  Procedural History 
On February 13, 2008, Miller filed a complaint against 
American in the United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania alleging a claim for benefits pursuant 
to ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).  Both parties filed cross-motions 
for summary judgment.  On November 30, 2009, the 
Magistrate Judge issued a report and recommendation 
proposing that that District Court grant Miller‟s motion for 
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summary judgment and order the retroactive reinstatement of 
his benefits.  Miller v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 08-CV-
277, 2009 WL 6039583, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2009).  
According to the report, American‟s termination of Miller‟s 
LTD benefits was arbitrary and capricious due to numerous 
procedural errors on the part of American.  See id. 
On March 8, 2010, the District Court rejected the 
Magistrate‟s report and granted summary judgment in favor 
of American.  Miller v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 08-CV-
277, 2010 WL 890016, at *11 (M.D. Pa. March 8, 2010).  
The District Court determined that American‟s termination 
decision was not arbitrary and capricious.  See id.  In its 
ruling, the District Court concluded that American had 
received new information from Dr. Gonzalez that Miller was 
“asymptomatic,” and therefore properly concluded that he 
was no longer disabled.  See id. at *8.  Additionally, the 
District Court concluded that the termination letter 
sufficiently described the reasons for discontinuing Miller‟s 
LTD benefits.  See id. at *9.  Likewise, the District Court 
determined that American did not impermissibly rely on 
Miller‟s failure to obtain his FAA medical certification.  See 
id.  Finally, the District Court found that American 
adequately addressed Miller‟s diagnoses and job requirements 
as set forth in the WME report.  See id. at *10. 
Miller filed a timely notice of appeal. 
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II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132(e)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over an order granting summary judgment.  See Shook v. 
Avaya, Inc., 625 F.3d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 2010).  “In exercising 
this review, „[w]e may affirm the order when the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the facts 
reviewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party.‟”  Id. (quoting Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 
(3d Cir. 2009)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  We review a challenge 
by a participant to a termination of benefits under ERISA 
§ 502(a)(1)(B) under an arbitrary and capricious standard 
where, as here, the plan grants the administrator discretionary 
authority to determine eligibility for benefits.  See Metro. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 115-16 (2008); Firestone 
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).  An 
administrator‟s decision is arbitrary and capricious “if it is 
„without reason, unsupported by substantial evidence or 
erroneous as a matter of law.‟”  Abnathya v. Hoffman-La 
Roche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 45 (3d Cir. 1993) (quotations and 
citations omitted).
2
 
                                                 
2
 In the ERISA context, the arbitrary and capricious 
and abuse of discretion standards of review are essentially 
identical.  See Howley v. Mellon Fin. Corp., 625 F.3d 788, 
793 n.6 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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 We review various procedural factors underlying the 
administrator‟s decision-making process, as well as structural 
concerns regarding how the particular ERISA plan was 
funded, to determine if the conclusion was arbitrary and 
capricious.
 3
  See, e.g., Glenn, 554 U.S. at 116-17; Estate of 
                                                 
3
 In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, the 
Supreme Court determined that when an ERISA plan grants 
discretion to the administrator, whether the administrator 
operates under a conflict of interest is a factor that must be 
weighed in determining if there was an abuse of that 
discretion.  489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).  After Firestone, our 
Court employed a “sliding scale” standard of review where 
the level of conflict would influence the intensity of arbitrary 
and capricious review.  See Post v. Hartford Ins. Co., 501 
F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 2007).  The Supreme Court‟s 
subsequent decision in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. 
Glenn, however, instructed that “Firestone means what the 
word „factor‟ implies, namely, that when judges review the 
lawfulness of benefit denials, they will often take account of 
several different considerations of which a conflict of interest 
is one.” 554 U.S. 105, 117 (2008). 
 As a result of Glenn, the “sliding scale” approach is no 
longer valid.  See Estate of Schwing v. The Lilly Health Plan, 
562 F.3d 522, 525 (3d Cir. 2009).  Instead, we “apply a 
deferential abuse of discretion standard of review across the 
board and consider any conflict of interest as one of several 
factors in considering whether the administrator or the 
fiduciary abused its discretion.”  Id.  Accordingly, even 
though our cases prior to Glenn are no longer good law to the 
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Schwing v. The Lilly Health Plan, 562 F.3d 522, 525-26 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  Whereas “[t]he structural inquiry focuses on the 
financial incentives created by the way the plan is organized,” 
i.e., whether there is a conflict of interest, “the procedural 
inquiry focuses on how the administrator treated the 
particular claimant.”  Post v. Hartford Ins. Co., 501 F.3d 154, 
162 (3d Cir. 2007).  Specifically, in considering the process 
that the administrator used in denying benefits, we have 
considered numerous “irregularities” to determine “whether, 
in this claimant‟s case, the administrator has given the court 
reason to doubt its fiduciary neutrality.”  See id. at 165 
(internal citations omitted).  Ultimately, we “determine 
lawfulness by taking account of several different, often case-
specific, factors, reaching a result by weighing all together.”  
Glenn, 554 U.S. at 117. 
III. 
A.  Termination of Benefits 
Section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA allows a participant to 
bring a claim to recover benefits due to him under the terms 
of the plan.  29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
4
  Miller asserts that 
                                                                                                             
extent they applied the “sliding scale” approach, the various 
factors that our Court has historically evaluated must still be 
considered on arbitrary and capricious review.  See id. at 526. 
 
4
 ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) provides: 
 “A civil action may be brought – 
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American‟s termination of his LTD benefits was arbitrary and 
capricious because (1) the decision was not based on 
substantial evidence, (2) American operated under a structural 
conflict of interest whereby it had the incentive to deny his 
claim, and (3) American committed numerous procedural 
errors during its review of his case.  We address each 
argument in turn. 
1. Support for the Termination Decision 
 We determined in Schwing that where there was “an 
abundance of evidence of [the claimant‟s] misconduct to 
support the denial of [the] claim,” a structural conflict of 
interest or procedural irregularities would not serve to “tip[] 
the scales in favor of finding that the [administrator] abused 
its discretion.”  562 F.3d at 526.  American contends, at the 
outset, that there was “overwhelming evidence of the absence 
of a disability” that “plainly” supports the termination of 
Miller‟s benefits, and that we should not consider whether 
any procedural irregularities tainted their decision-making.  
(American Br. at 19, 34.)  In this regard, American relies 
heavily on Dr. Gonzalez‟s description of Miller as being 
“asymptomatic” to argue that there was substantial support 
                                                                                                             
 (1) by a participant or beneficiary –
 … 
 (B) to recover benefits due to him under 
the terms of the plan, to enforce his rights under 
the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to 
future benefits under the terms of the plan[.]” 
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for their decision to terminate benefits and that any 
irregularities should be disregarded.  American essentially 
argues that because Dr. Gonzalez labeled Miller as 
asymptomatic, he had actually been erroneously awarded 
benefits in the past and this had gone unnoticed.  We 
disagree. 
 The record demonstrates, contrary to American‟s 
assertion that Miller simply slipped through the cracks, that 
American exercised frequent oversight in Miller‟s case.  In 
fact, American reviewed and relied on documentation from 
Dr. Gonzalez stating that Miller was asymptomatic and, on 
multiple occasions over several years, found that this 
description supported the payment of benefits.  Notably, in 
2003, American determined that Miller “[m]edically qualifies 
for [the] disability pension program” and reinstated his LTD 
benefits after receiving records describing him as 
asymptomatic.  (App. at 148.)  Yet, after receiving additional 
reports containing this same description, American terminated 
Miller‟s benefits.  As such, American interpreted Dr. 
Gonzalez‟s characterization of Miller as asymptomatic to 
mean that he was both eligible for disability benefits and that 
his benefits should be terminated.  American‟s reliance on the 
term “asymptomatic” as the linchpin of Miller‟s ineligibility 
for disability benefits is, therefore, misplaced. 
 Further, the record reveals that although Dr. Gonzalez 
reported that Miller was no longer taking medication, he 
consistently stated that Miller was still under his care.  
Indeed, American noted twice after receiving records from 
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Dr. Gonzalez that Miller was unable to return to work as a 
pilot.  (Id. at 105-06.)  In addition, American‟s internal 
records repeatedly state that Miller was diagnosed with 
anxiety and brief reactive psychosis.  (Id. at 104-06.)  
Notably, only a few days before American terminated 
Miller‟s benefits, American‟s records state that Miller‟s 
diagnosis was the “same.”  (Id. at 107.)  Finally, Dr. 
Gonzalez‟s letter in support of Miller‟s appeal to the PBAC 
notes that his psychiatric conditions are permanent and that 
continued treatment is necessary to stabilize his health. 
 A review of the administrative record, therefore, 
demonstrates that although Miller may not have been 
outwardly manifesting symptoms, his psychiatric diagnoses 
remained constant and required regular treatment.  As such, 
Dr. Gonzalez‟s report that Miller suffered from anxiety 
diagnosis and brief reactive psychosis constituted “an illness 
or injury verified through a qualified medical authority,” thus 
satisfying the definition of disability under the Plan.  (Id. at 
717.)  Unlike Schwing, the administrative record does not 
contain “an abundance of evidence” of ineligibility such that 
we should ignore any procedural defects in the termination 
decision.  562 F.3d at 526.  Because we disagree with 
American‟s assertion that Dr. Gonzalez‟s description of 
Miller as being “asymptomatic” forecloses our inquiry into 
whether the termination of benefits was arbitrary and 
capricious, we consider each factor in turn. 
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2. Structural Conflict of Interest 
 In a situation where “a benefit plan gives discretion to 
an administrator or fiduciary who is operating under a conflict 
of interest, that conflict must be weighed as a „facto[r] in 
determining whether there is an abuse of discretion.‟”  
Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115 (internal citation omitted).  In 
Glenn, the Supreme Court held that a conflict emerges 
“where it is the employer that both funds the plan and 
evaluates the claims” because “[i]n such a circumstance, 
„every dollar provided in benefits is a dollar spent by . . . the 
employer; and every dollar saved . . . is a dollar in [the 
employer‟s] pocket.‟”  554 U.S. at 112.  (internal citation 
omitted). 
 Prior to Glenn, we consistently held that there is no 
conflict of interest when an employer operates an actuarially 
grounded plan whereby claims are paid through a trust.  See, 
e.g., Post, 501 F.3d at 164 n.6; Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours and Co., 268 F.3d 167, 174 (3d Cir. 2001); Pinto v. 
Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 388 (3d Cir. 
2000); Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 113 F.3d 433, 437 n.4 
(3d Cir. 1997); Abnathya, 2 F.3d at 45 n.5.  In that type of 
arrangement, the employer makes fixed contributions based 
on an actuarial formula that estimates the plan‟s projected 
benefit obligation.  See Pinto, 214 F.3d at 388.  Therefore, we 
previously determined that no conflict existed because the 
employer did not incur a direct expense in allowing benefits, 
nor did it gain a direct benefit in denying claims.  See id. 
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 In light of Glenn, however, we conclude that this 
approach is no longer valid.  Glenn instructs that a conflict 
arises where an employer both funds and evaluates claims.  
See 554 U.S. at 112.  The Supreme Court‟s broad view of 
whether a conflict of interest exists, therefore, encompasses 
an arrangement where an employer makes fixed contributions 
to a plan, evaluates claims, and pays claims through a trust.  
Even in an actuarially grounded plan, the employer provides 
the monetary contribution and any money saved reduces the 
employer‟s projected benefit obligation.  See id.  The 
Supreme Court did recognize, however, that a conflict 
“should prove less important (perhaps to the vanishing point) 
where the administrator has taken active steps to reduce 
potential bias and to promote accuracy, for example, by 
walling off claims administrators from those interested in 
firm finances.”  Id. at 117. 
 Turning to the case at hand, the Plan is a defined 
benefit plan that American funds based on an actuarial 
formula.  The record reveals that although American did meet 
ERISA‟s minimum funding requirements in 2006, the year 
Miller‟s benefits were terminated, the Plan still lacked funds 
to meet a significant amount of its projected benefit 
obligation.  Despite the fact that American made fixed 
contributions to the Plan, every dollar that American saved by 
reducing disability payments decreased its projected benefit 
obligation.  American argues that WME‟s involvement in the 
review process insulated American from any conflict of 
interest because the WME report was binding on all parties.  
We do not believe that the WME review totally eliminated 
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any conflict of interest.  First, it is undisputed that American 
terminated Miller‟s benefits well before WME became 
involved at the appeal stage.  Second, Charlotte Teklitz, the 
PBAC representative, testified in her deposition that 
American could seek further review of the WME report‟s 
conclusions if it was dissatisfied with its analysis.  (App. at 
549.)  Though the WME review of Miller‟s claims may have 
ameliorated some of the effects of the conflict of interest, the 
fact remains that American did have some incentive to 
terminate Miller‟s benefits.  And, even though this conflict is 
rather indirect, we must afford it some weight in light of 
Glenn.  See 554 U.S. at 112.  Therefore, American‟s 
structural conflict of interest weighs slightly in Miller‟s favor. 
3. Procedural Factors 
 a. Reversal of Position 
 An administrator‟s reversal of its decision to award a 
claimant benefits without receiving any new medical 
information to support this change in position is an 
irregularity that counsels towards finding an abuse of 
discretion.  See, e.g., Post, 501 F.3d at 164-65; Pinto v. 
Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 393 (3d Cir. 
2000).  Miller claims that American abruptly terminated his 
benefits in 2006 upon evaluating the same information that it 
had previously found to support an award of benefits.  The 
District Court found that our decision in Foley v. 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local Union 
98 Pension Fund, 271 F.3d 551 (3d Cir. 2001), dictates that 
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American should not be prevented from terminating Miller‟s 
benefits, despite the fact that it previously awarded them.  See 
Miller, 2010 WL 890016, at *8.  In any event, the District 
Court further concluded, American did not unjustifiably 
reverse its position as to Miller‟s eligibility because American 
received reports from Dr. Gonzalez that Miller was 
asymptomatic in 2005 and 2006 to support the conclusion that 
he was no longer disabled.  See id. 
 Our review of the decision in Foley leads us to 
conclude that it is not controlling in this situation.  In Foley, 
the claimant argued that it was arbitrary and capricious for the 
employer to refuse to apply an exception for calculating 
credited service when it had previously interpreted the 
pension plan to allow the exception for other employees.  See 
271 F.3d at 554.  We rejected that argument, reasoning that it 
would be improper to effectively foreclose an employer from 
correcting a previous erroneous interpretation of a plan.  See 
id. at 558-59.  Thus, Foley deals with an employer‟s reversal 
of a previous interpretation of a plan‟s language.  It does not 
address the significance of an employer‟s inconsistent 
treatment of medical evidence used to determine whether a 
claimant is disabled.  In fact, we made clear in Post, decided 
after Foley, that an employer‟s reversal of position as to 
whether a claimant is disabled is a significant factor to be 
weighed on arbitrary and capricious review.  See Post, 501 
F.3d at 164-65. 
 Turning to the District Court‟s alternative conclusion 
that American did not reverse its position, we disagree that 
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the documentation from Dr. Gonzalez provided new 
information regarding Miller‟s eligibility for benefits.  The 
records that American received from Dr. Gonzalez in 2005 
and 2006 stating that Miller was asymptomatic do not differ 
in any material aspect from the records submitted in 2003 that 
American determined supported a disability finding.  For 
example, Dr. Gonzalez reported in 2003 that Miller was 
diagnosed with anxiety and brief reactive psychosis, but that 
he was currently asymptomatic.  Later, in 2005, Dr. Gonzalez 
stated that Miller was asymptomatic and was working toward 
preventing manifestations of stress.  Similarly, in 2006, Dr. 
Gonzalez reported that Miller‟s diagnoses remained the same 
and that he was asymptomatic.  Each report mirrors the next 
and identifies Miller as “asymptomatic.”  Thus, the more 
recent records were only “new” to the extent that they had not 
been received before; they did not provide any new 
information. 
 Moreover, American admitted that it could not 
determine whether there was any change that occurred in 
Miller‟s psychiatric condition between January 2003 and May 
2007.  As a result, the information that American relied upon 
to terminate Miller‟s benefits in 2006 was the same type of 
documentation that American interpreted to support a 
disability finding in 1999 and again in 2003 through 2006.  
We recognize that American‟s initial payment of Miller‟s 
benefits does not operate as an estoppel such that they can 
never terminate benefits.  But, in the absence of any 
meaningful evidence to support a change in position, 
American‟s abrupt reversal is cause for concern that weighs 
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in favor of finding that its termination decision was arbitrary 
and capricious.  See id.; see also McOsker v. Paul Revere Life 
Ins. Co., 279 F.3d 586, 589 (8th Cir. 2002) (reversal of 
position supported arbitrary and capricious finding where 
information used to terminate benefits did “not vary 
significantly from the [previous] opinions”). 
 b. Reliance on Non-Existent Plan Requirements 
 We have previously held that an employer who 
imposes requirements extrinsic to the plan in evaluating 
eligibility for benefits acts arbitrarily and capriciously.  See, 
e.g., Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 113 F.3d 433, 443 (3d 
Cir. 1997); Epright v. Envtl. Res. Mgmt., Inc. Health and 
Welfare Plan, 81 F.3d 335, 342-43 (3d Cir. 1996).  Miller 
argues that American acted arbitrarily and capriciously by 
relying in part on his failure to obtain his FAA medical 
certification.  The District Court found that the reference to 
the FAA certification was “troubling” and “regrettable” when 
the Plan did not impose this requirement.  Miller, 2010 WL 
890016, at *9.  Nonetheless, the District Court concluded that 
the termination decision could have been based on 
American‟s inability to verify Miller‟s disability or Miller‟s 
failure to obtain the recertification.  See id.  Because the letter 
concluded by noting that “verification of [Miller‟s] continued 
disability cannot be established,” the District Court reasoned 
that the FAA medical certification language was “harmless 
error.”  Id.  The District Court did not consider whether 
American relied on Miller‟s failure to obtain his FAA 
certification during the appeal stage. 
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 Based on the plain language in the termination letter, 
as well as the other evidence in the record, we conclude that 
American did rely, to some extent, on Miller‟s failure to 
obtain his FAA medical certification.  First, the letter states 
that American was “unable to verify either the existence of a 
continuing medical disability or [Miller‟s] continued 
substantial progress towards obtaining [his] medical 
certification.”  (App. at 98.)  Therefore, there were apparently 
two potential bases for American‟s decision, one of which 
was Miller‟s failure to seek his FAA medical recertification.  
In addition, the letter instructs that Miller could receive 
“further favorable consideration” if he demonstrated that he 
was actively pursuing the certification.  (Id.)  It is unlikely 
that American would include this instruction if Miller‟s 
obtaining his FAA certification did not somehow bear on his 
eligibility for benefits. 
 Second, American offered no evidence to establish, 
contrary to the termination letter‟s focus, that it did not rely 
on this requirement.  Dr. Bettes, the author of the termination 
letter, testified that he could not recall whether the decision to 
terminate Miller‟s benefits was influenced by Miller‟s failure 
to seek medical certification.  (Id. at 1130.)  In fact, Dr. Bettes 
also testified that a pilot‟s failure to apply for FAA 
certification could contribute to his decision to deny benefits.  
(Id.) 
 Moreover, Drs. Crain and Seskind placed significant 
weight on Miller‟s failure to obtain his medical certification 
in the WME report.  Notably, Dr. Crain remarked that “[t]he 
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records of Dr. Gonzalez do not document any psychiatric 
problems or issues to explain his failure to obtain the medical 
certificate, so that it cannot be attributed to a mental 
disorder.”  (Id. at 310.)  Likewise, Dr. Seskind devoted a 
significant portion of his report to a discussion of Miller‟s 
failure to regain his FAA medical certification.  His analysis 
concluded by noting that because Miller had not been denied 
this certification, he was not suffering from a mental illness 
and therefore was not truly disabled.  Because American 
adopted the WME report and included it in the final letter 
affirming the termination of Miller‟s benefits, it relied on this 
requirement.  Given that American did not offer any evidence 
to contradict the plain language of the letter, the overreaching 
emphasis on this requirement in the termination letter and 
throughout the appeal process demonstrates that it was a 
factor in the termination decision here.  The Plan does not 
compel a pilot to seek FAA medical certification in order to 
be eligible for LTD benefits.  Thus, American‟s imposition of 
this requirement is a factor that counsels towards finding that 
the termination decision was arbitrary and capricious.  See 
Mitchell, 113 F.3d at 443; Epright, 81 F.3d at 342-43. 
 c. Compliance with Section 503 of ERISA and 
Accompanying Regulations 
 Section 503 of ERISA requires that every employee 
benefit plan must: 
“(1) provide adequate notice in writing to any 
participant or beneficiary whose claims for 
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benefits under the plan has been denied, setting 
forth the specific reasons for such denial, 
written in a manner calculated to be understood 
by the participant, and 
(2) afford a reasonable opportunity to any 
participant whose claim for benefits has been 
denied for a full and fair review by the 
appropriate named fiduciary of the decision 
denying the claim.” 
29 U.S.C. § 1133.  The accompanying regulations note that 
“this section sets forth minimum requirements for employee 
benefit plan procedures pertaining to claims for benefits by 
participants and beneficiaries.”  29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(a).  
The regulations require a plan administrator to provide 
written notification of any adverse benefit determination 
setting forth 
[I]n a manner calculated to be understood by the 
claimant . . . (i) [t]he specific reason or reasons 
for the adverse determination; (ii) [r]eference to 
the specific plan provisions on which the 
determination is based; (iii) [a] description of 
any additional material or information 
necessary for the claimant to perfect the claim 
and an explanation of why such material or 
information is necessary[.]” 
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Id. § 2560.503-1(g)(1).  The District Court determined that 
§ 503 and the accompanying regulations were irrelevant to 
Miller‟s claim, as it was brought pursuant to § 502.  See 
Miller, 2010 WL 890016, at *9.  The District Court erred in 
this regard.  Although § 502 provides the private right of 
action to bring a claim to recover benefits due, § 503 sets 
forth the basic requirements governing ERISA plans.  To that 
end, a plan that does not satisfy the minimum procedural 
requirements of § 503 and its regulations operates in violation 
of ERISA.  Therefore, an administrator‟s compliance with 
§ 503 in making an adverse benefit determination is probative 
of whether the decision to deny benefits was arbitrary and 
capricious.  See, e.g., Majeski v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 590 
F.3d 478, 484 (7th Cir. 2009); Hobson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 
574 F.3d 75, 87 (2d Cir. 2009); Grossmuller v. Int’l Union, 
715 F.2d 853, 856-57 (3d Cir. 1983); Kao v. Aetna Life Ins. 
Co., 647 F. Supp. 2d 397, 410 (D.N.J. 2009).  Indeed, the 
Department of Labor has noted that “the procedural 
minimums of the regulation are essential to procedural 
fairness.”  Department of Labor Pension and Welfare Benefits 
Administration, 65 Fed. Reg. 70246, 70255 (proposed 
Nov. 21, 2000) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2560). 
 We briefly addressed whether a denial letter set forth 
adequate “specific reasons” under § 503 and the 
accompanying regulations in Grossmuller, 715 F.2d at 858.  
There, we determined that the administrator‟s termination 
letter did not comply with § 503 where it informed the 
claimant that his benefits were terminated because he was 
found to be otherwise gainfully employed, without providing 
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any factual basis to support the decision or stating upon what 
evidence the administrator relied.  See id.  Conversely, in 
Syed v. Hercules Inc., 214 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 2000), we 
concluded that the letter satisfied § 503 where it explained 
that the claimant‟s benefits were terminated because the 
results of the particular doctor‟s independent medical 
evaluation demonstrated that he was no longer disabled.  See 
214 F.3d at 162-63.  The administrator reached this 
conclusion after analyzing the present physical diagnosis in 
light of the definition of total disability under the plan.  See 
id. 
 Other decisions addressing this discrete issue are also 
instructive.  For example, the Seventh Circuit held in Halpin 
v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., that the termination letter did not 
satisfy § 503 when it stated that “no objective medical 
evidence was contained in [the] claim to substantiate total 
disability from any gainful occupation.”  962 F.2d 685, 692-
93 (7th Cir. 1992).  The court instructed that the bare 
conclusions in the letter, unsupported by any rationale, did 
not set forth “specific reasons” as mandated by § 503.  See id. 
at 693.  Similarly, in Vanderklok v. Provident Life and 
Accident Insurance, 956 F.2d 610 (6th Cir. 1992), the Sixth 
Circuit found that the denial letter did not comply with § 503.  
There, the letter informed the claimant accordingly, “[w]e 
regret that the claim does not qualify . . . because the proof 
does not establish that the insured is totally and permanently 
disabled.”  956 F.2d at 616.  The court determined that the 
letter‟s purported “reasons” were simply unsupported 
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conclusions that did not provide any specific information as 
to the basis for the denial.  See id. 
 By contrast, in Hobson v. Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Co., 574 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2009), the Second Circuit reasoned 
that the denial letter complied with § 503 because it described 
the precise information that was lacking from the file, such as 
whether claimant‟s depression was severe enough to result in 
suicidal thoughts or hospitalization, whether the seizures were 
ongoing, and whether the claimant exhibited the diagnostic 
criteria for the relevant disease.  Accordingly, the Second 
Circuit found that the administrator‟s letter presented the 
claimant with a specific rationale for the denial of benefits, 
not simply a conclusory statement that she was ineligible.  
See id. at 87. 
 We find the termination letter in this case to be legally 
deficient under § 503 for two reasons.  First, the letter does 
not provide “specific reasons for [the] denial, written in a 
manner calculated to be understood by the participant.”  29 
U.S.C. § 1133.  The letter states that American is “unable to 
verify either the existence of a continuing medical disability 
or [Miller‟s] continued substantial progress towards obtaining 
[his] FAA medical certification.”  (App. at 98.)  American‟s 
inability to “verify” Miller‟s disability is a bare conclusion 
that does not provide a specific reason for the termination 
decision.  Rather, this purported explanation is a general 
blanket assessment that Miller is ineligible for disability 
benefits.  The letter makes no mention of Miller‟s specific 
diagnoses nor the precise information that is lacking from his 
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file.  Moreover, the letter provides no insight into why the 
records that American received, and based on which 
American previously awarded and reinstated benefits, would 
no longer support a disability finding.  American was on 
notice that this letter was not “written in a manner calculated 
to be understood by the participant” because Miller 
subsequently inquired as to the specific reasons for the 
termination, but was simply referred back to the letter itself.  
The letter‟s mention of FAA certification is the most specific 
reason given for the termination, but this reference is 
misleading because it was not a prerequisite under the Plan 
and therefore not a valid reason to deny Miller‟s LTD 
benefits.  The language in the letter is more akin to the 
conclusory statements in Grossmuller, Halpin, and 
Vanderklok, where the plan administrator summarily 
concluded that the claimant was ineligible, or that the 
evidence received did not support the claim without providing 
further factual support.  See Halpin, 962 F.2d at 692-93; 
Vanderklock, 956 F.2d at 616; Grossmuller, 715 F.3d at 858.  
And, unlike the letter in Hobson that set forth the precise 
information lacking from the file or the decision in Syed that 
analyzed the physical diagnosis in light of the definition of 
total disability, the letter here did neither.  See Hobson, 574 
F.3d at 87; Syed, 214 F.3d at 162-63.  Thus, we believe that 
the language of the termination letter is conclusory and does 
not provide the “specific reasons” as to why Miller was no 
longer eligible for benefits, falling short of the requirements 
under § 503. 
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 Second, we conclude that the termination letter does 
not provide the precise information necessary to advise Miller 
how to perfect his claim.  The regulations accompanying 
§ 503 require the termination letter to describe “any 
additional material or information necessary for the claimant 
to perfect the claim and an explanation of why such material 
or information is necessary.”  29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-
1(g)(1)(iii).  Here, the letter informed Miller that “[i]n order 
to receive further favorable consideration, you will need to 
demonstrate that you are actively pursuing obtaining your 
FAA medical certification.”  (App. at 98.)  Obtaining this 
certification, however, is not a requirement under the Plan 
and would therefore not serve to change his disability status.  
Given that the letter did not set forth any additional 
instruction as to how Miller could achieve a favorable 
disability determination, it does not comply with 29 C.F.R. 
§ 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iii).  The termination letter here does not 
satisfy the basic procedural mandates of ERISA, as set forth 
in § 503 and the relevant regulations.  Instead of ensuring the 
procedural fairness of the termination decision, this letter 
made it exceedingly difficult for Miller to understand, let 
alone challenge, the bases for American‟s course of action.  
For that reason, American‟s noncompliance with the statute 
weighs in favor of finding that their decision was arbitrary 
and capricious. 
 d. Analysis of All Relevant Diagnoses 
 An administrator‟s failure to address all relevant 
diagnoses in terminating a claimant‟s benefits is also a cause 
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for concern that suggests the decision may have been 
arbitrary and capricious.  See Kosiba v. Merck & Co., 384 
F.3d 58, 68-69 (3d Cir. 2004).  In Kosiba, we instructed the 
district court to consider on remand whether the administrator 
properly evaluated the claimant‟s medical conditions.  See id.  
In doing so, we emphasized that an administrator‟s failure to 
take into account multiple documented diagnoses suggests 
that a denial of benefits was not the product of reasoned 
decision-making.  See id.  Similarly, in Kalish v. Liberty 
Mutual/Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 419 F.3d 501 
(6th Cir. 2005), the Sixth Circuit held that the administrator‟s 
reliance on an outside physician‟s report that made only a 
passing reference to the claimant‟s diagnosis of depression, 
without further analysis, called into question the 
reasonableness of the decision.  The court noted it was 
significant that the claimant had two distinct diagnoses, 
depression and a heart condition, but the administrator failed 
to adequately consider whether the depression alone would 
impact the claimant‟s ability to return to work.  See id. at 510. 
 American argues, and the District Court agreed, that it 
adequately considered Miller‟s anxiety diagnosis because Dr. 
Crain concluded, “Miller does not have overt evidence of a 
treatable medical condition.”  (App. at 310.)  Miller counters 
that American did not properly examine his anxiety diagnosis 
because neither the termination letter nor the WME report 
sufficiently analyzed this condition. We note at the outset that 
the termination letter does not mention either of Miller‟s 
diagnoses – anxiety disorder or brief reactive psychosis.  
Therefore, we look to whether the WME report addressed 
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Miller‟s claimed diagnoses.  Our review of the WME report 
itself leads us to the conclusion that, contrary to American‟s 
broad interpretation of the evaluators‟ analysis, it did not 
adequately scrutinize Miller‟s anxiety diagnosis.  In ordering 
the report, American specifically directed WME to evaluate 
Miller‟s claims that he suffered from these two conditions.  
Additionally, the 2006 letter from Dr. Gonzalez, mentioned in 
the WME report, states that Miller suffered from anxiety. 
 Despite the prompting by American, neither Dr. Crain 
nor Dr. Seskind devoted any of their discussion to Miller‟s 
anxiety diagnosis.  Dr. Seskind made no reference to anxiety 
in his portion of the report, but rather began his analysis by 
noting that it was essential that Miller not suffer from 
psychosis.  He went on to discuss the symptoms of psychosis, 
the fact that Miller was not taking any medication, and that he 
had not obtained his FAA medical certification.  Dr. Seskind 
concluded by noting that “[s]ince this is now getting into the 
distant past of at least six years,” Miller was no longer 
disabled because he was not undergoing formal psychiatric 
treatment.  (Id. at 312.)  In this regard, Dr. Seskind‟s report 
focuses exclusively on Miller‟s psychotic episode; there is no 
discussion whatsoever of Miller‟s claim that he continued to 
suffer from anxiety or Dr. Gonzalez‟s 2006 letter stating the 
same. 
 Dr. Crain‟s portion of the report is likewise deficient in 
its analysis of Miller‟s anxiety diagnosis.  Although Dr. Crain 
does mention Miller‟s anxiety, he makes this reference in the 
context of describing the various medical records from Dr. 
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Gonzalez.  Interestingly, Dr. Crain acknowledged Dr. 
Gonzalez‟s report that “[n]o medical treatment could revert, 
undue or cure [Miller‟s] underlying condition.”  (Id. at 310.)  
Yet, Dr. Crain ultimately observed that the “psychiatric 
records show no objective evidence of continuing disability,” 
without providing insight into why the anxiety diagnosis was 
no longer supported.  (Id.)  He further noted that “[a]lthough I 
do not have all of the facts concerning the emotional stresses 
that led to the onset of Mr. Miller‟s psychosis, I assume that 
now, after nine years, these issues have been dealt with 
through psychotherapy.”  (Id. at 311.)  This conclusion 
seemingly focuses on Miller‟s initial diagnosis of psychosis.  
The remainder of Dr. Crain‟s report discusses the risk that 
Miller may have another psychotic episode. 
 Notwithstanding the fact that Drs. Crain and Seskind 
had received records chronicling Miller‟s anxiety and were 
directed by American to evaluate this diagnosis, the WME 
report did not present any analysis of this condition or explain 
why it no longer rendered Miller disabled.  Whereas the 
report does address Miller‟s psychosis, it fails to devote any 
meaningful discussion to Miller‟s claim that he suffered from 
continuing anxiety.  A mere reference that Miller has been 
diagnosed with anxiety, without providing any explanation of 
why that diagnosis is no longer supported, casts doubt on the 
reasonableness of American‟s decision-making.  See Kalish, 
419 F.3d at 510.  American did not request further 
clarification from WME and accepted the report as provided 
in ultimately terminating Miller‟s LTD benefits.  Although 
we recognize that American is not required to credit Dr. 
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Gonzalez‟s reports over Drs. Crain and Seskind simply 
because he was Miller‟s treating physician, see Black & 
Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 834 (2003), we 
are skeptical of American‟s exclusive reliance on the 
conclusions in the WME report to determine that Miller was 
not disabled when the report neglects to substantively analyze 
Miller‟s anxiety diagnosis.  Therefore, given that American 
did not mention the anxiety diagnosis in its termination letter 
and the WME report was incomplete in its analysis, American 
cannot be said to have fully considered all of Miller‟s 
diagnoses.  This omission counsels towards finding that 
American‟s decision was arbitrary and capricious.  See 
Kosiba, 384 F.3d at 68-69. 
 e. Job Requirements 
 Although we have not previously so held, various 
courts have determined that an administrator‟s proper 
consideration of the claimant‟s ability to perform his or her 
job requirements in light of the relevant diagnosis is a 
significant factor to evaluate on arbitrary and capricious 
review.  See, e.g., Elliott v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 473 F.3d 
613, 619 (6th Cir. 2006) (determining that plan 
administrator‟s decision could not be considered “reasoned” 
when there was no discussion of claimant‟s duties or her 
ability to complete them in light of diagnoses); Kalish, 419 
F.3d at 507 (finding that administrator‟s conclusion that 
claimant “might be capable of sedentary work cannot be a 
rational basis for finding that he was not disabled, given that 
his former occupation required him to walk, stand, and reach 
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for several hours a day”); Lamanna v. Special Agents Mut. 
Benefits Ass’n, 546 F. Supp. 2d 261, 296-97 (W.D. Pa. 2008).  
In Elliott, the Sixth Circuit expressed skepticism of the 
insurance company‟s conclusion that the claimant was not 
disabled when it did not consider the specific requirements of 
her position.  See 473 F.3d at 619.  The court observed that 
the administrator‟s denial letter simply recited the diagnoses 
of the claimant‟s condition, but did not provide any 
explanation of how the claimant could be expected to perform 
the functions of her job in light of these ailments.  See id.  
Therefore, the court determined, the administrator “cannot be 
said to have given a reasoned denial of [the] claim.”  Id. 
(emphasis in original). 
 We find this analysis persuasive because it is essential 
that any rational decision to terminate disability benefits 
under an own-occupation plan consider whether the claimant 
can actually perform the specific job requirements of a 
position.  The District Court did not consider whether 
American adequately addressed Miller‟s ability to fulfill his 
job requirements.  Miller contends that neither the termination 
letter nor the WME report provided any explanation of how 
he could perform the essential duties of his position as a pilot.  
American did not address Miller‟s ability to function as a 
pilot in the termination letter; however, the WME report 
canvasses the extent to which it considered the actual job 
requirements Miller had to fulfill.  American included a job 
description and a list of essential functions that a pilot must 
perform when it ordered the WME report.  Therefore, we 
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consider whether the WME report adequately addressed 
Miller‟s ability to function as a pilot. 
 Even though the WME evaluators determined that 
Miller was not disabled, they arrived at this conclusion 
without considering whether he could actually perform his 
duties as a pilot in light of his diagnoses.  According to 
American‟s job description, a pilot must, among other things, 
“be able to work varying hours of the day or night,” possess 
“[c]apability of decision-making under stress,” as well as 
“[t]he ability to adapt to diversified flight schedules, 
situations, or scenarios.”  (App. at 303-05.)  In addition, 
because the Plan provides “own occupation” disability 
benefits, it is essential to consider whether a pilot is capable 
of working in that capacity, regardless of his ability to 
function in a different position.  Although Dr. Crain 
concluded that Miller was “not disabled from his occupation 
as a Pilot,” he also recognized that Miller was at risk of 
having another psychotic episode if he was exposed to 
physical fatigue, sleep deprivation, and emotional stress.  (Id. 
at 311.)  As such, there is a striking incongruity between Dr. 
Crain‟s conclusion that Miller could return to work as a pilot 
– having to operate under considerable stress – and his 
recognition that stress, fatigue, and sleep deprivation could 
prompt another psychotic episode.  Moreover, Dr. Crain did 
not address how the fact that Dr. Gonzalez had diagnosed 
Miller with anxiety would be compatible with his ability to 
work under stress as a pilot. 
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 On the whole, we believe that Dr. Crain‟s conclusion 
that Miller could perform as a pilot, without explaining how 
his claimed anxiety and latent risk of psychosis would be 
compatible with this uniquely stressful position, is 
perfunctory.  Accordingly, American‟s failure to address the 
specific demands that Miller would face as a pilot suggests 
that the termination decision was not reasoned and based on 
an individualized assessment of Miller‟s ability.  Thus, this is 
a significant oversight that suggests the decision was arbitrary 
and capricious.  See Elliott, 473 F.3d at 619; Kalish, 419 F.3d 
at 507. 
4. Weighing of the Factors 
 To decide whether an administrator‟s termination of 
benefits is arbitrary and capricious, we “determine lawfulness 
by taking account of several different, often case-specific, 
factors, reaching a result by weighing all together.”  Glenn, 
554 U.S. at 117.  Here, we give significant weight to our 
conclusions that American reversed its initial position that 
Miller was disabled and terminated his benefits without 
receiving supporting information that differed in any material 
way from the information upon which it previously relied, 
and that American considered Miller‟s failure to obtain his 
FAA medical certification when it was not required under the 
Plan.
5
  We find equally troubling American‟s noncompliance 
                                                 
5
 Though the imposition of an extra-Plan requirement 
is far from the only irregularity presented in this case, we note 
that this fact alone likely would have supported a holding that 
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with ERISA‟s notice requirements under § 503, as well as 
American‟s failure to fully evaluate Miller‟s anxiety 
diagnosis and to reconcile the demanding job requirements of 
a commercial pilot with Miller‟s continuing anxiety and risk 
that he would experience a recurring psychotic episode.  
Finally, we afford slight weight to the fact that American 
operated under a conflict of interest in light of its incentive to 
deny benefits claims.  Viewing these factors as a whole, we 
believe that American‟s decision to terminate Miller‟s LTD 
benefits was not the product of reasoned decision-making and 
substantial evidence.  See Abnathya, 2 F.3d at 45.  Rather, 
there were numerous procedural irregularities and substantive 
errors on American‟s part, giving us “reason to doubt its 
fiduciary neutrality.”  Post, 501 F.3d at 165.  Thus, we 
conclude that American‟s termination of Miller‟s benefits was 
arbitrary and capricious.  See Glenn, 554 U.S. at 117. 
B.  Remedy 
 Having determined that American abused its 
discretion, we consider the appropriate remedy.  We have not 
squarely addressed the issue of the appropriate remedy for an 
improper termination of benefits under § 502(a)(1)(B).  
American argues that if we find the termination decision to be 
arbitrary and capricious, we must remand the case to the Plan 
administrator pursuant to our decision in Syed, 214 F.3d at 
162.  There, we determined that a remedy for a violation of 
                                                                                                             
American‟s decision to terminate Miller‟s LTD benefits was 
arbitrary and capricious. 
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ERISA § 503 is a remand to the plan administrator so as to 
provide the claimant with the benefit of a full and fair review 
of the claim.  See id.  We are not persuaded.  Miller‟s claim is 
based on § 502 for an improper termination of his LTD 
benefits.  As previously discussed, whether the notice 
requirements of § 503 are met is relevant to this action only 
insofar as American‟s noncompliance with the statute factors 
into arbitrary and capricious review.  Syed is readily 
distinguishable and not controlling on this issue. 
 Other courts addressing this question have determined 
that retroactive reinstatement of a claimant‟s benefits is the 
proper remedy when the administrator‟s termination decision 
was unreasonable.  See, e.g., Pannebecker v. Liberty Life 
Assur. Co. of Boston, 542 F.3d 1213, 1221 (9th Cir. 2008); 
Schneider v. Sentry Group Long Term Disability Plan, 422 
F.3d 621, 629 (7th Cir. 2005); Hackett v. Xerox Corp. Long-
Term Disability Income Plan, 315 F.3d 771, 776 (7th Cir. 
2003); Sanford v. Harvard Indus., Inc., 262 F.3d 590, 599 
(6th Cir. 2001); Halpin, 962 F.2d at 697; Harrison v. 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 543 F. Supp. 2d 411, 424 (E.D. 
Pa. 2008).  In deciding whether to remand to the plan 
administrator or reinstate benefits, we note that it is important 
to consider the status quo prior to the unlawful denial or 
termination.  See Hackett, 315 F.3d at 776.  As such, an 
important distinction emerges between an initial denial of 
benefits and a termination of benefits after they were already 
awarded.  In a situation where benefits are improperly denied 
at the outset, it is appropriate to remand to the administrator 
for full consideration of whether the claimant is disabled.  To 
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restore the status quo, the claimant would be entitled to have 
the plan administrator reevaluate the case using reasonable 
discretion.  In the termination context, however, a finding that 
a decision was arbitrary and capricious means that the 
administrator terminated the claimant‟s benefits unlawfully.  
Accordingly, benefits should be reinstated to restore the status 
quo. 
 In this case, American abused its discretion in 
terminating Miller‟s LTD benefits.  Therefore, retroactive 
reinstatement of his benefits is necessary. 
IV. 
 We conclude that American acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in terminating Miller‟s LTD benefits.  The 
decision-making process that American applied was flawed in 
many aspects, demonstrating that the assessment of Miller‟s 
disability was not the product of a reasoned, disinterested 
fiduciary.  Given that multiple factors counsel in Miller‟s 
favor and that his benefits were unlawfully terminated, we 
find that retroactive reinstatement of his benefits is the 
appropriate remedy.  Therefore, we reverse and remand to the 
District Court for entry of summary judgment in favor of 
Miller.  Additionally, we direct the District Court to order 
American to retroactively reinstate Miller‟s LTD benefits, 
effective from the date of termination. 
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WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 It is doubtful that the Administrator acted in an 
arbitrary and capricious manner in accepting the clinical 
findings of American‟s medical evaluators rather than those 
of Miller‟s physician.  As we have held, “[u]nder the arbitrary 
and capricious standard, the court must defer to the 
administrator of an employee benefit plan unless the 
administrator‟s decision is clearly not supported by the 
evidence in the record or the administrator has failed to 
comply with the procedures required by the plan.”  Abnathya 
v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 41 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(reversing grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff 
and directing entry of judgment in favor of defendant).   
 
 Further, the court must be vigilant not to 
“substitute its own judgment for that of the [administrator] in 
determining eligibility for plan benefits” and may overturn a 
plan administrator‟s decision only if it is “without reason, 
unsupported by substantial evidence or erroneous as a matter 
of law.”  Id. at 45 (quotations omitted).    
 
 The Administrator‟s adoption of the opinions of 
American‟s medical evaluation team, rather than that of 
Miller‟s physician, is a choice that is not unusual in cases like 
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this and is one usually entrusted to the Administrator.
6
  See 
Stratton v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 363 F.3d 250, 
258 (3d Cir. 2004) (courts may not “impose on plan 
administrators a discrete burden of explanation when they 
credit reliable evidence that conflicts with a treating 
physician‟s evaluation” (quoting Black & Decker Disability 
Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 834 (2003))); see also Boiling v. 
Eli Lilly & Co., 990 F.2d 1028, 1029-30 (8
th
 Cir. 1993) (“The 
                                                 
6
   This deferential standard in the face of a clear, if not 
uncommon, conflict of interest is not without criticism.  
Indeed, we have observed that it may “simply invite[ ] 
drafters of employee benefit plans to insert boilerplate 
language in plan documents to ensure that courts will apply a 
deferential standard of review over the decisions of the plan 
administrator.”  Abnathya, 2 F.3d at 45 n.5 (discussing John 
H. Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 Sup. 
Ct. Rev. 207, 220-23); see also Paul J. Schneider & Brian M. 
Pinheira, ERISA: A Comprehensive Guide 8-15 (3d ed. 2008) 
(“Most employee benefit plans contain (or can easily be 
amended to provide) appropriate boiler-plate language giving 
plan administrators discretion to interpret the plan”).  
Although we have questioned this degree of deference, 
neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has addressed the 
issue further, see Abnathya, 2 F.3d at 45 n.5 (expressing 
desire for additional guidance from the Court or an 
amendment to the ERISA statute), and it is, therefore, a 
standard that we are obliged to uphold. 
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Committee did not abuse its discretion merely because there 
was evidence before it that would have supported an opposite 
decision”).   
 
  In addition, neither the asserted procedural 
missteps cited by Miller nor the alleged conflict of interest 
actually prejudiced his administrative appeal.  These factors 
were at most de minimus and did not hinder full consideration 
of the relevant issues.  A much more objective test for 
evaluating whether the termination of benefits was arbitrary 
and capricious lies in the Administrator‟s failure to address 
Miller‟s claim that, because of his illness, he could not return 
to work as a pilot for American.    
 
 The Plan at issue in this case provides long term 
benefits to any “pilot who is prevented from acting as a 
cockpit crewmember in the service of [American Airlines] 
due to a [d]isability.”  Disability, in turn, is defined as “an 
illness . . . verified through a qualified medical authority that 
prevents a pilot from continuing to work as a pilot for 
[American Airlines].”   
 
 An individual who does not have a medical 
certificate issued by the FAA may not be employed as a pilot 
for American Airlines.  Miller did not have a certificate in the 
year 2006, when his benefits were terminated.  Moreover, 
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federal regulations state that, in order to be eligible for such a 
certificate, one must, among other things, have “[n]o 
established medical history or clinical diagnosis of . . . [a] 
psychosis.”  14 C.F.R. § 67.107(a)(2).7  The Plan does not 
require Miller to apply for a medical certificate after the onset 
of his disability, nor did it authorize American to apply for 
certification on his behalf.  However, the requirement of FAA 
medical certification is inherent in the Plan‟s definition of 
disability.  By failing to address this issue, the Plan 
Administrator deprived Miller of a full and fair hearing and 
thus committed an abuse of discretion.  See, e.g., Grossmuller 
v. Int‟l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement 
                                                 
 
7
    “As used in this section, „psychosis‟ refers to a mental 
disorder in which: 
(i)  The individual has manifested delusions, hallucinations, 
grossly bizarre  
or disorganized behavior, or other commonly accepted 
symptoms of this  
condition; or (ii)  The individual may reasonably be expected 
to manifest  
[those symptoms].”  14 C.F.R. § 67.107(a)(2).  A 
waiver of these requirements may be granted only if the 
applicant shows to the satisfaction of the Federal Air Surgeon 
that the duties applied for “can be performed without 
endangering public safety.”  14 C.F.R. § 67.401(a). 
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Workers of Am., 715 F.2d 853, 857 (3d Cir. 1983) (“To 
afford a plan participant whose claim has been denied a 
reasonable opportunity for full and fair review, the plan‟s 
fiduciary must consider any and all pertinent information 
reasonably available to him”). 
 
Miller‟s lack of FAA medical certification has been an 
issue from the outset of this case.  In its October 23, 2006, 
letter advising him that his disability benefits would be 
terminated, American stated, “we are unable to verify either 
the existence of a continuing medical disability or your 
continued substantial progress towards obtaining your FAA 
medical certification.”  In addition, Miller was advised that, 
“[i]n order to receive further favorable consideration, you will 
need to demonstrate that you are actively pursuing obtaining 
your FAA medical certification.”   
 
 In his application for the administrative appeal 
of the termination decision, Miller cited his inability to obtain 
a medical certificate from the FAA.  He explained that he was 
“unable to return to active flight status due to a medical 
history of psychosis and a general anxiety disorder.”  When 
asked for the basis of his appeal, he wrote, “still sick, under 
continuing psychiatric care, and unable to obtain an airman 
medical certificate due to psychosis and a general anxiety 
disorder.”   
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       The medical opinions of Dr. Gonzalez as well 
as those of Drs. Crain and Seskind underscore the 
interdependence between the Plan‟s definition of “disability” 
and the requirement of FAA medical certification.  As Dr. 
Gonzales reported in a letter dated November 22, 2006, “Mr. 
Miller has been continually and [will] be permanently 
disabled from obtaining a Class One Medical Certificate as 
required by F.A.A. regulations since August of 1998.”  
Further, he had “not regained his Class One Medical 
Certificate as the exclusive and direct consequence of the 
permanent status of his mental illness.”8 
 
 As a member of the Plan‟s medical evaluation 
team, Dr. Seskind, himself a Senior Aviation Medical 
Examiner, noted,  
                                                 
8
   This was not the first time that Dr. Gonzalez 
referred to the requirement of FAA medical certification.  In a 
June 10, 2003, letter to American Airlines, he wrote that “Mr. 
Miller has been asymptomatic and able to safely return to his 
usual work since the spring of 2001.  I anticipate Mr. Miller 
will return to his regular work upon reinstatement of his FAA 
medical certificate . . . . Once released by the chief FAA 
psychiatrist, Mr. Robert Miller‟s working hours should 
strictly abide by the FAA regulations on maximum hours to 
be worked without periods of rest in between (FAA [Part 12] 
requirements).”  
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“From an AME [f]ederal 
[a]viation [s]tandpoint, I quote 
[14 C.F.R.] Section 67.107, for 
first class airman medical 
certificate[.  T]he medical 
standards are that there be no 
psychosis, which means that the 
individual has manifested 
delusions, hallucinations, grossly 
bizarre or disorganized behavior 
or other commonly accepted 
symptoms of his condition or the 
individual may reasonably be 
expected to manifest [such 
symptoms].”  
 
He concluded, “[m]y medical opinion is that while a senior 
AME would not be able to issue a medical certificate in such 
a case on his own, . . . the FAA might well favorably regard 
this gentleman as capable of flying under proper supervision. 
. . . [T]here is no real evidence that he is disabled and 
incapable of performing his flight duties.”   
 
 Thus, although the Plan‟s medical experts (and, 
arguably, Miller‟s own physician) opined that he was 
physically capable of returning to work as a pilot, the fact 
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remains that Miller is now and will remain unable to resume 
those duties unless the FAA reissues his medical certificate. 
 
 The Administrator‟s lack of attention to this 
issue may have been explained in the deposition of Charlotte 
Teklitz, American‟s Managing Director of Benefits and 
Productivity, who was delegated by American‟s Pension 
Benefits Appeals Committee to resolve appeals from 
disability benefit terminations.  She testified that “[t]he plan 
has no requirement . . . for the pilot to continue to try to get 
[his] FAA [certification]” and later explained, “[y]ou have to 
be disabled from the occupation of pilot, and the FAA 
certification is not specifically relevant.”  Therefore, she 
denied the plaintiff‟s appeal because of “the third party 
medical review[,] which indicates from both of these doctors 
that he is no longer disabled from the occupation of pilot.”   
    
 Potentially inconsistent with that testimony, 
however, are American‟s Pilot Disability Case Management 
Notes for Miller.  These indicate that, in 2003 (after 
American had terminated the plaintiff‟s disability benefits the 
first time), the fact that FAA regulations precluded plaintiff 
from returning to work within five years of stopping certain 
medications may have been a factor in determining that his 
disability benefits should be reinstated.   
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 One note, for example, mentioned that Miller 
“[c]an not RTW [return to work] for 5 yrs after stopping 
meds. . . . [M]eds discontinued Jan. 02- PCD of Jan 07”).  
Those same notes indicate that, in November 2005, American 
hoped to “obtain authoriz[ation] to submit [his medical 
information] to [the] FAA” on a “hunch . . . that he might be a 
candidate” for medical clearance notwithstanding his history 
of psychosis “after a 10 yr stable observation period.”   
 
 To reiterate, under American‟s Plan, a pilot may 
receive long-term disability benefits if he is prevented from 
acting as a crew member in service to the company because 
of an illness or injury.  Miller meets that definition.  He is 
prevented from returning to employment as a pilot because 
his medical history (and the basis for his nearly decade-long 
receipt of disability benefits) precludes him from obtaining 
the necessary licensure.  In other words, he has an illness that 
seemingly would prevent the FAA from certifying him; as a 
result, he contends he is unable to function as a pilot for 
American and therefore is entitled to benefits.  
 
Whether Miller was “prevented” from returning as a 
“cockpit crew member” due to a “disability” or history of a 
disability that prevents his service was a contention raised by 
him but not decided by the Pension Benefit Appeals 
Committee.  The Committee‟s failure to address that claim 
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deprived Miller of a full and fair review, see 29 U.S.C. § 
1133(2), and, therefore, amounted to an abuse of discretion. 
 
 To clarify, I need not (and do not) decide that Miller‟s 
lack of FAA certification per se entitles him to benefits.  It is 
enough that the Administrator declined to rule on a serious 
and substantial issue.  
 
Remand is not necessary because there is no dispute 
over the relevant facts and the legal issues were apparent to 
the parties.  Accordingly, I join in reversing the judgment of 
the District Court.  
 
 
